Cecil L. Lynch v. J. A. Hogle : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Cecil L. Lynch v. J. A. Hogle : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Marr, Wilkins & Cannon; G. A. Marr; C. W. Wilkins; Richard H. Nebeker; Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lynch v. Hogle, No. 8022 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2017
j 
Case No. 8022 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
~of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~CECIL L. LYNCH, 
Plamtiff antl Appellom;t, 
-vs.-
J. A. ·HOGLE, J. E. HOGLE, et al, 
·doing business as J. A. HOGLE & 
co., -
Defendo:.'lll.ts OJnd Re·sponilents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
··r· . -~- ·~ -~~~ ~. ·~ "\.4 
~·~~.. - u~ .~. ~ A.,.JI 
~·- -
1
"' ~R, WILKINS & CANNON, 
~ t.B t G.~!. MARR, 
.. .: Q_W ___ WILKINS, 
·"'·"'d'"• ~~pcerne ~JJ!ARD· H. NE-BEKER, 
Attorneys for Defentl.O/Ii.ts 
atntl Resp1ondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF COX11 ENTR 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............ . ..................... ···----------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ · 2 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES------------------------------------------------------ 17 
POINT I. UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOP-
PEL LYNCH MUST BEAR THE LOSS OF HIS MIS-
PLACED TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS AGENT 
BADGER ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
POINT II. DEFENDANT J. A. HOGLE & CO. DEALT 
WITH BADGER IN THE NORMAL ARMS-LENGTH 
BROKER-TO-BROKER RELATIONSHIP AND IN 
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS AND 
ENTIRELY IN GOOD FAITH ................................................ 27 
STOCKBROKERS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE ........................ 36 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 46 
A UTHOR1TIES CITED 
Adams v. Silver Shield Mining and Milling Co. et al, 
82 Utah 586, 21 P. 2d 886 .................................................................... 34 
Austin v. Hayden, (1912) 171 Mich. 38, 137 N.W. 317 ........ 17, 25, 26,35 
Barbour v. Sproul, et al, 239 Pa. 171, 86 Atl. 714 ................................ 24 
Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 161 Pac. 448 ........................................ 34 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish Fork Irr. Co., 
107 Utah 279, 152 P. 2d 547 ................................................................ 34 
Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle, 64 Utah 572, 232 Pac. 541.. .............. 33 
Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U. S. 19, 57 L. Ed. 1047 ............................ 23 
Holman v. Coslin, 93 N.Y.S. 126 .............................................................. 45 
Knowlton v Fitch, 52 N. Y. 288 ................................................................ 27 
Korns v. Thomson & McKinnon, 22 F. Supp. 
442 ... : ................................................................ 17, 18, 21, 25, 32, 33, 46 
Kryl v. Pierce, 289 Ill. App. 10, 6 N.E. 2nd 521 .................................... 27 
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235 ............................................................ 27 
In re T. A. Mcintyre & Co., 181 Fed. 955 ............................................ 34 
Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 
52 L. Ed. 835 .................................................................................... 24, 44 
Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104 .................. 24, 44 
Tuckerman v. Mearns, 262 F. 607 ............................................................ 45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
TEXTS CITED 
Meyer on the Law of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges, Sec. 134 .. 27 
73 A.L.R. 1409 .............................................................................................. 33 
79 A.L.R. 592 ................................................................................................ 21 
STATUTES 
U tab Code Annotated 1953 
Sec. 16-3-1 .............................................................................................. 44 
Sec. 16-3-7 .............................................................................................. 45 
Sec. 16-3-8 .............................................................................................. 45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CECIL L. LYNCH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
J. A. HOGLE, J. E. HOGLE, et al, 
doing business as J. A. HOGLE & 
co., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIThiiNARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8022 
This is a suit wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover 
the value of 40 shares of stock alleged to have been con-
verted by the defendants. The plaintiff will hereinafter 
be referred to as "Lynch", the defendants as "J. A. 
Hogle & Co", and Richard C. Badger as "Badger". The 
evidence showed that Badger was an independent broker 
with his principal place of business at Ogden, Utah; that 
Lynch was a resident of Ogden and a customer of 
Badger; that all of Lynch's stock transactions including 
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that involving the 40 shares were made direct by Lynch 
with Badger in the Ogden office of Badger; that Badger 
had an Omnibus Account with J. A. Hogle & Co. but 
there was no privity of contract nor any business deal-
ingH whatsoever between Lynch and J. A. Hogle & Co. 
Badger took his own life on ~larch 27, 1951 (R. 40). 
George C. :Maw was appointed Administrator of Badger's 
estate. Subsequently an audit of the accounts of Badger 
showed (Exhibit 6, Schedule A-2) that Badger was short 
~ ew York stocks belonging to his customers of a value 
exceeding One-half ).Iillion Dollars; that Badger had 
been a crook and his estate insolvent (R. 57) ; that plain-
tiff as one of Badger's customers had been defrauded by 
Badger along with numerous other customers of Badger. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of 
plaintiff's case, the Trial Court found that J. A. Hogle 
& Co. was neither legally nor equitably responsible for 
Badger's wrongdoing and the Court granted defendants' 
1notion for disn1issal upon the merits pursuant to Rule 
41(b). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Finding of Fact No. 2 summarizes the nature of 
Badger's business as follows: 
"2. That one Richard C. Badger, as a sole pro-
prietor, for some years immediately preceed-
ing his death on March 27, 1951, was engaged, 
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under the nmne of Richard C. Badger & Co., 
in a general brokerage business dealing in 
stocks and bonds and other securities; that 
the principal place of business of Richard C. 
Badger was Ogden, Utah, where as such 
broker he maintained the usual broker's facili-
ties and offices 'vith board room for custo-
mers showing listed stocks on the New York 
Stock Exchange and on the Salt Lake Stock 
E.xchange, equipped with Western Union 
ticker service direct from the New York 
Stock Exchange, \vith electrical equipment (a 
translux) so installed to move in illuminated 
manner the ticker tape across a lighted screen 
so as to show to customers of Richard C. 
Badger sitting in the board room quotations 
and trades in New York stocks as such infor-
mation came over the Western Union ticker 
service; that Richard C. Badger was a mem-
ber of the Salt Lake Stock Exchange where 
he transacted a large volume of business; 
that in addition to transactions in listed 
stocks, Richard C. Badger conducted a gen-
eral business in 'over-the-counter' securities 
and dealt directly with banks and brokerage 
houses in Chicago, Illinois, in New Jersey 
and elsewhere; that as such broker he was a 
direct competitor with the defendants, and as 
such competitor took care to see that his 
customers were not disclosed to the defend-
ants; that the general books of Richard C. 
Badger & Co. were kept and maintained in 
the Ogden office of Richard C. Badger & Co. 
and the principal bank account of Richard C. 
Badger & Co. was kept and maintained with 
First Security Bank of Utah N. A. at Ogden, 
Utah." (R. 185) 
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Badger had a large business with active customers' 
accounts exceeding 500 (R. 66). Badger dealt with 
numerous stockbrokers, banks and e..xclianges throughout 
the United States. Because Badger did not have a seat 
on the New York Stock Exchange, it was necessary that 
he buy New York stocks through a member of the New 
York Exchange and for this purpose Badger, in N ovem-
ber of 1949 (R. 168), established an Omnibus Account 
with J. A. Hogle & Co. at Salt Lake City. J. A. Hogle & 
Co. charged Badger full commissions on all trades just 
as J. A. Hogle & Co. did with any other customer (R. 
170). In addition to the Omnibus Account, Badger estab-
lished at J. A. Hogle & Co. a personal account in which 
Badger pledged local mining stocks to secure money bor-
rowed by him. 
J. A. Hogle & Co. paid no bills of Badger, furnished 
him no facilities, and shared no profits or losses with 
Badger ( R. 146). In all respects Badger was an inde-
pendent broker and so operated his business. 
With respect to the defendants the Court found: 
"3. That the defendants, J. A. Hogle, J. E. Hogle, 
et al., are now and at all times hereinafter 
mentioned, were engaged in the brokerage 
business as co-partners under the name of J. 
A. Hogle & Co., with their principle place of 
business at Salt Lake City, Utah, but with 
branch brokerage· offices at Ogden, Utah, 
New York City and elsewhere; that as such 
brokers they have a membership in the New 
York Stock Exchange and are eligible to 
transact business on that exchange." (R. 185) 
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The evidence shows (&"Xhibit L) that Hogle main-
tains his principal offiee at Salt Lake City 'vi th branch 
offices at Los Angele:::;, Beverly Hills, Riverside, Reno, 
Spokane, San Diego, Denver, Boulder, Ogden, New York 
City, Butte and ~[issoula (R. 130). In this connection 
Hogle is one of the largest stockbrokers in the western 
Fnited States. At all of these places of business there 
are trades in K ew York stocks, including stock of 
Standard Oil of California. 
While Lynch, the plaintiff, was not an extensive 
trader, yet as a custon1er of Badger, he did know his way 
around Badger's brokerage office. He would sit in the 
chairs in the board room and watch the quotations as 
they passed on the translux. He knew the Badger physi-
cal layout, knew its staff and its machines (R. 19). He 
had traded before. He knew that Badger had a direct 
service through vVestern Union from the New York Stock 
Exchange on which Badger obtained New York quota-
tions. He knew Badger's bookkeeper and cashier (R. 20). 
Lynch had purchased in September and in October of 
1950 New York stocks through Badger and Badger had 
been slow to deliver the certificates to Lynch (R. 22). 
"Q. Yes. It took from September 7th until Octo-
ber 17th before you actually received the 
American Telephone and Telegraph stock 
that you had bought? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. During that period of time you trusted Mr. 
Badger to deliver those stocks to you, didn't 
you~ 
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A. Well, I jogged his memory several times. I 
told him I was getting kind of nervous, I 
wanted my stock. 
Q. You were getting a little bit nervous about 
him were you 1 He was slow in making those 
deliveries 1 
A. I thought so. 
Q. Now calling your attention to these forty 
shares of General Motors which you pur-
chased and paid for on November 9, 1950, 
when did you get that stock 1 
A. It shows delivered February 5th. That is, as 
near as I can tell, that's correct. 
Q. February 5, 1951. So you didn't get your 
General Motors stock, even though you had 
paid for it, until February 5, 1951, notwith-
standing the fact that you had paid for it on 
November 9, 1950, is that right~ 
~\. Yes sir." (R. 22) (See also defendants' Ex-
hibit 1.) 
THE FoRTY SHARE STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA TRANS-
ACTION. 
"\Vith specific reference to the transaction wherein 
Lynch directed Badger to purchase 40 shares of Standard 
Oil of California stock the evidence showed: that on 
March 15, 1951 Lynch directed Badger to buy 40 shares 
but did not pay Badger any money at that time; that on 
~Iarch 15th Badger wired J. A. Hogle & Co. to buy for 
Badger's Omnibus Account at the market 40 shares; that 
pursuant to Badger's wire, J. A. Hogle & Co. instructed 
its New York office to buy the 40 shares; that the 40 
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shares were purchas~·d on the New York Bxchange; and 
that in due course J. A. Hogle & Co. advised Badger of 
the purchase. Exhibit L con1prises the original docu-
ments showing the instructions from Badger to J. A. 
Hogle & Co. to purchase the 40 shares and the advice 
giYen by J. A. Hogle & Co. to Badger that the shares had 
been purchased on ~I arch 15th and that the Omnibus 
Account of R. C. Badger & Co. had been charged with the 
purchase. Exhibit C shows that after Badger was 
advised by J. ~\. Hogle & Co. of the purchase then 
Badger billed Lynch. On the following day i.e. March 
16th, Lynch paid Badger by cashier's check, Exhibit A. 
Exhibit E is the original purchase slip wherein J. A. 
Hogle & Co. advised Badger of the purchase. This 
E~.hibit shows that 40 shares of Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia stock were purchased at 44% for the account of 
R. C. Badger & Co., Post Office Box 968, Ogden, Utah. 
Exhibit 8 covering R. C. Badger & Co.'s transactions in 
Standard Oil of California stock also shows the 40 share 
purchase, the date of the purchase on Exhibit 8 being 
entered as :Jfarch 20th. The last named date is the settle-
lnent date but both Exhibits relate to the same transac-
tion. In other words, the purchase was made on March 
15th and Badger's Omnibus Account charged with the 
amount of the purchase plus the usual commissions, and 
the 40 shares ca1ne into the Omnibus Account in the 
ordinary broker-to-broker Omnibus Account transaction. 
This purchase was made on the strength of the securities 
in the Omnibus Account and on an axtension of credit in 
that account to Badger hy J. A. Hogle & Co. In connec-
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tion with this extension of credit, it will be noted that 
Badger was doing business on a large scale. Exhibit G 
shows that Badger through his Omnibus Account ob-
tained credit from J. A. Hogle & Co. at times exceeding 
Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars. Exhibit 13 
shows that in attaining this large credit, Badger had 
pledged with J. A. Hogle & Co. in the Omnibus Account 
stocks having a value far &.1weeding the amount Badger 
owed J. A. Hogle & Co. Exhibit 13 shows that on settle-
Inent date March 16th the additional amount that J. A. 
Hogle & Co. might have loaned against the securities over 
and above the amount actually owed to be Forty-Two 
Thousand, One Hundred Eighty-Five and 92/100 ($42,-
185.92) Dollars. Also see in this connection Exhibits 12 
to 16 inclusive. 
At the close of the business day (March 15th), J. A. 
Hogle & Co.'s New York office had received orders from 
all of the J. A. Hogle & Co.'s western offices for the pur-
chase of a total of 153 shares of Standard Oil stock. 
(Defs' Exhibit 10, R. 8-1 & 85). In making these pur-
chases J. A. Hogle & Co. cleared the round lot of 100 
shares through the Stock Clearing Corporation and the 
two odd lots were settled through the odd lot broker. To 
cover the two odd lots, J. A. Hogle & Co. received from 
the odd lot broker one certificate for 50 shares and one 
certificate for three shares. All certificates were issued 
in the name of J. A. Hogle & Co. (Exhibit 10, R. 131). 
When stock is held in the name of the broker (J. A. Hogle 
& Co.) it is designated as street stock. No certificate for 
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any amount of Standard Oil 8tock was ever 1nade or 
i~sued in the na1ne of plaintiff or Badger. No certificate 
for 40 8hare~ ever cmne into a~istence as plaintiff errone-
ously implies by the statement at page 3 of his brief that 
"there was actually held by Hogle the 40 shares thus 
purchased.'' :Jir. Nimnoth, cashier of J. A. Hogle & Co., 
testified there was never any 40 share certificate issued 
either to J. A. Hogle & Co., to Badger or to Lynch (R. 
S-t & 85); that any purchase less than 100 shares had to 
be consummated on the New York Exchange through the 
odd lot broker and that it is the practice on the Exchange 
at the end of the trading day to settle with the odd lot 
broker on the basis of net balances, and on :March 15, 
1951 this settlement was made with the odd lot brokers 
by those brokers delivering to J. A. Hogle & Co. one 
certificate for 50 shares and one certificate for 3 shares 
of stock of Standard Oil of California. In other words, at 
the close of business on ~Iarch 15th, the net balance 
showed the odd lot broker owed J. A. Hogle & Co. 53 
shares of Standard Oil of California stock (R. 84 to 
87). 
On ~iarch 24, 1951 Badger wired J. A. Hogle & Co. 
to sell 50 shares of Standard Oil of California stock at 
the market and pursuant to Badger's order and on that 
day, J. A. Hogle & Co. sold 50 shares at 46Vs and credited 
Badger's 01nnibus Account with Two Thousand Two 
Hundred Eighty-One and 82/100 ($2,281.82) Dollars as 
the amount received on the sale. Exhibit 9 consisting of 
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three papers shows the telegraphic instructions from 
Badger to J. A. Hogle & Co. and J. A. Hogle & Co.'s 
report of the sale to Badger. 
This Exhibit (No. 9) comprises the original docu-
ments which passed between Badger's Ogden Office 
and Hogle's Salt Lake Office with regard to the 50 
~hare transaction. The blue sheet contains the ticker 
tape reading RB No.4 OP sell 50 SD MKT, 50-MKT-S. 
:Mr. Niemoth testified that RB meant Badger, the No.4 
1neanf it was the fourth transaction of Badger's that 
day through the Hogle Office; that OP means an open 
order (an order that is good until filled or cancelled), 
that SD are the code letters for Standard Stock and 
)IKT means market. The white sheet attached shows 
that Hogle reported to Badger that pursuant to Badger's 
order, J. A. Hogle & Co. had sold for the account of 
Badger the 50 shares. The white sheet shows the com-
mission charged Badger, the New York and Federal 
T&xes and the net amount as Twenty-Two Hundred 
Eighty-One and 21/100 ($2,281.21) Dollars. Exhibit No. 
9 shows nothing but the ordinary transaction in the 
Omnibus Account and nowhere are 40 shares or Lynch's 
name mentioned. Mr. Niemoth testified (R. 165) that 
tlie 50 shares were sold pursuant to the written order 
(Exhibit No.9) of Mr. Badger and the proceeds from the 
sale credited to Badger's Omnibus Account in the ordi-
nary course of business. 
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Exhibit 8 covering all of the Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia transactions of Badger subsequent to December 
31, 1950, shows a sale of 50 shares under date of March 
2S, 1951 but the last named date was the settlement date 
and not the trade date. The actual sale was made March 
2-1, 1951 as evidenced by Exhibit 9. Lynch argues in his 
brief that the sale of 50 shares constituted an unauthorized 
sale by J~ A. Hogle & Co. of the 40 shares which Lynch 
had ordered frmn Badger. It is obvious from E&hibits 
L, 8, and 9 and from testimony of Mr. Niemoth (R. 122, 
125 & 126) that the 50 share sale had no reference to 
Lynch nor to any 40 share certificate of stock. The 50 
share transaction was pursuant to Badger's written 
instructions to sell securities in his Omnibus Account. 
As the Court can see, no shares of stock were ever 
earmarked as belonging to Lynch, and it is obviously 
impossible to determine whose 50 shares of stock Badger 
ordered J. A. Hogle & Co. to sell on March 24, 1951. For 
all that is known by the parties to this lawsuit, one of 
the other 500 customers of Badger may have directed 
him to sell the 50 shares and may have received the pro-
ceeds from such sale. However, for the sole purpose of 
argument before this Court and for the sake of clarity in 
nomenclature, let it be assumed that the purchase by Bad-
ger of 40 shares on JYiarch 15th and the sale of 50 shares 
on March 24th involved Lynch's stock. As respondents 
will point out hereafter, such is not the fact nor the law, 
but it is the basis of plaintiff's claim of conversion, and 
yet upon such basis, the Trial Court found J. A. Hogle 
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& Co. to be an innocent pledgee for value and under the 
principle of equitable estoppel that plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover. 
From time to time Badger would draw on his Omni-
bus Account and receive checks of J. A. Hogle & Co. 
These checks were charged against the account in the 
ordinary course of business. At times Badger would 
give his check to J. A. Hogle & Co. for credit to the 
account. Badger knew that he must keep the account 
adequately margined or the securities in the account 
would be sold to pay the indebtedness of the account. 
Sometimes this giving and receiving of checks would 
occur simultaneously. This was necessitated, however, 
by the fact that Badger "·as in need of "federal funds" 
with which to pay drafts drawn on him, through the 
Federal Reserve Bank, by banks and brokers in distant 
-cities who were sending securities for delivery to Badger 
upon payment of the drafts covering the purchase price 
of the securities (R. 143 to 145). The Rules of the F'ed-
eral Reserve Bank would not permit the Federal Reserve 
to accept checks drawn on a bank. The Rules required 
that the Federal Reserve Bank receive federal funds 
before surrendering the securities. Federal funds could 
only be obtained by Badger going to a private bank, a 
member of the Federal Reserve System, and obtaining 
from the bank a draft drawn on the Federal Reserve 
against the account of the bank maintained with the 
Federal Reserve. The evidence also disclosed (R. 145) 
that there were occasions when securities were sent by 
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banks or brokers in distant cities to a Salt Lake City bank 
for delivery upon payn1ent of the sight draft attached 
and that in those instances the Salt Lake City bank would 
not surrender the securities to Badger without receiving 
Salt Lake City funds. In other words, Badger maintain-
ing his principal bank account with the First Security 
Bank in Ogden, Utah, had to have possession of Salt 
Lake City funds or federal funds before he could obtain 
delivery in Salt Lake City. During the full period of 
time that J. A. Hogle & Co. dealt with Badger, every 
check given by Badger to J. A. Hogle & Co. was paid 
promptly and in due course by the bank upon which it 
was drawn, with one exception. That exception is the 
check dated J\1arch 24, 1951 given by Badger to J. A. 
Hogle & Co. three days before Badger took his life. The 
check was for Thirty-Four Thousand ($34,000) Dollars 
and drawn on the First Security Bank at Ogden. 
This check was returned in due course by the Ogden 
bank to J. A. Hogle & Co. marked "maker deceased" and 
"insufficient funds." When the Thirty-Four Thousand 
($34,000) Dollar check was initially received by J. A. 
Hogle & Co. on J\1arch 24th, it was credited to the Omni-
bus Account in the ordinary course of business (Exhibit 
H). At the time the check was so received by J. A. Hogle 
& Co., J. A. Hogle & Co. gave Badger their check drawn 
on Walker Bank & Trust Company (Exhibits H & 2) in 
the amount of Thirty-Two Thousand ($32,000) Dollars. 
Badger liad represented to J. A. Hogle & Co. that Badger 
was in need of federal funds to pay for securities shipped 
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to him through the Federal Reserve Bank. This check 
(&wibit 2) is endorsed: "For Federal Reserve Draft, 
R. C. Badger & Co.-Badger." This was the last trans-
action that J. A. Hogle & Co. had with Badger. With 
reference to these check transactions, 1lr. Niemoth testi-
fied (R. 1+2 to 1+~) that in no single instance was 
the Omnibus Account ever under-margined and that 
Badger was entitled to draw in money on the account 
any excess margins; that such is the common practice in 
the brokerage business. \\~ith specific reference to the 
last transaction :\Ir. Niemoth said: 
"Q. Now if you should today take this Exhibit 
and deduct, or charge Badger, with the $34,-
000 which represented the check which 
bounced, state whether or not you would still 
have in the account adequate margins and 
there would be an excess in the account which 
might be loaned~ 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. That is true whether you would apply this 
check to the $44,161.01, which was the excess 
in the omnibus account, or whether you would 
apply it to the $42,947.09 in the firm account~ 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. Now assume that Badger had not even given 
you a check for $34,000 on March 24th. Would 
the account have been adequately margined~ 
A. Yes, it would; yes, it would." (R. 143) 
EMibits 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 show in detail the 
status of Badger's Omnibus Account with the marginal 
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requirements at all times and the excess n1argin in the 
account. 'These Exhibits show that at no time was the 
account under-n1argined and that Badger was free to 
draw in n1oney the excess margins at his volition (H. 134 
to 143). 
With reference to J. A. Hogle & Co. giving Badger 
immediate credit in the Omnibus Account for checks of 
Badger drawn on his Ogden bank account, the evidence 
shows this to be strictly in accordance with Regulation 
"T" (Exhibit 7, pages 13 and 14) of the Federal Reserve 
System relating to brokers' Omnibus Accounts. Such 
ilnmediate credit is fully in accord with the customs and 
practices of the brokerage business (R. 143 to 146) where 
there must be dispatch and finality in all transactions. 
Float and uncertainty in the time of axecution of trans-
actions in brokers' accounts would paralyze the business 
where even hourly changes are of large consequence. 
Lynch on l\farch 16th delivered to Badger a cashier's 
check endorsed in negotiable form as payment for the 40 
shares of Standard Oil stock. Badger never did "order 
out" the 40 shares for Lynch, but Badger appropriated 
the cashier's check to Badger's own use. Badger was 
an embezzler and on March 27, 1951, his body was found 
in his garage. It is common knowledge that he committed 
suicide (R. 40). The Certified Public Accountants' audit 
of the affairs of Richard C. Badger & Co. (Defs' Exhibit 
6) shows that Badger was short New York stocks in the 
amount of Five Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand, Nine 
Thousand Eleven and 43/100 ( $526,911.43) Dollars. 
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Regarding the business relationship of J. A. Hogle 
& Co. with Badger and Hogle's good faith, the Trial 
Court found: 
''11. That the business relationship between 
Richard C. Badger & Co. and J. A. Hogle & Co., 
and between Richard C. Badger personally and 
the individual partners of J. A. Hogle & Co., was 
the ordinary broker-to-broker business relation-
ship with the parties dealing at arms length and 
in the ordinary course of business; that J. A. 
Hogle & Co., paid no expenses of the firm of 
Richard C. Badger & Co.; that J. A. Hogle & Co. 
charged Richard C. Badger & Co. full commis-
sions on all transactions; that Richard C. Badger 
& Co. paid for all teletype service, wire service 
and other facilities used by his firm, and that no 
part thereof was furnished or paid for by J. A. 
Hogle & Co.; that Richard C. Badger & Co. main-
tained its own staff consisting of the usual per-
sonnel of brokerage offices, i.e., board markers, 
cashier, bookkeepers, teletype operators, etc.; that 
J. A. Hogle & Co. did not share profits with 
Richard C. Badger & Co. nor did it participate in 
the management or conduct of the firm of Richard 
C. Badger & Co., or in the determination of the 
policies of that firm. 
"12. That J. A. Hogle & Co. did nothing 
whatever to deceive, mislead or impair the rights 
of plaintiff, and that Richard C. Badger & Co. 
did not hold itself out to its customers as being the 
agent or representative of J. A. Hogle & Co.; that 
Richard C. Badger & Co. &-xJpressly represented 
to plaintiff that Richard C. Badger & Co. dealt 
directly with the New York Stock Exchange and 
not through any other person, firm or corpora-
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tion; that the loss sustained by the plaintiff did not 
result fron1 any act or neglect of J. A. Hogle, J. E. 
Hogle or any other partners of the firm of J. A. 
Hogle & Co., and that J. A. Hogle & Co. had no 
knowledge that Richard C. Badger or the firm of 
Richard C. Badger & Co. was in financial diffi-
culties prior to the time that Badger died on 
~Iarch 27, 1951." 
ARGU:JIENT AND ALITHORITIES 
POINT I. UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ES-
TOPPEL LYNCH l\IUST BEAR THE LOSS OF HIS MIS-
PLACED TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS AGENT, 
BADGER. 
The Trial Court found the facts against the plain-
tiff and there was overwhelming evidence to support 
the Court's findings. 
THE LEADING CASE 
The Court granted defendants' motion for dismissal 
on the basis of Korns v. Thornpson & McKinnon, 22 F. 
Supp. 442 which was cited to and read in its entirety by 
the Court (R. 182). The Korns case relies upon Austin 
v. Hayden, 171 Mich. 38, 137 N.W. 317. These two cases 
constitute the two leading authorities upon the factual 
situation now before this Court. Plaintiff has not cited 
nor attempted to distinguish these decisions for their 
conclusive determination of the present case can plainly 
be seen. The decisions are well reasoned and set out at 
length the relationship of a customer to an initial broker 
and to the carrying broker on the New York Exchange. 
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In those decisions it is pointed out that when a customer 
purchases New York stocks he is deemed to know that 
such stocks can only be purchased by a stockbroker hav-
ing a seat on the New York Exchange and that it always 
is necessary and is customary practice for hrokers not 
having a seat on such Exchange to forward the purchase 
orders to a carrying broker. 
Trial Judge Ray Van Cott Jr. in granting the mo-
tion to dismiss stated the decision in Korns v. Thomson 
& JlcKimum, supra, covered about every point made 
by counsel for Lynch. The l{orns case is so com-
prehensive and in point that Judge Van Cott felt it to be. 
decisive. \Ve particularly invite the Supreme Court's 
attention to the Korns decision. There the defendants 
Thomson and ::\icKinnon, a co-partnership, engaged in 
business (similar to that of J. A. I-Iogle & Co.) as stock-
brokers, the partners having seats on the New York 
Stock Elxchange and on other Exchanges. Their prin-
cipal office was in New York City with branch offices 
elsewhere. A brokerage firm at Des Moines, Iowa, known 
as Harper Strauss & Company, (and situated similarly 
to Richard A. Badger & Co. in this case), operated a 
stock brokerage business in Iowa. The Iowa brokers 
had no seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Thomson 
& McKinnon, the New York brokers, handled a large 
volume of business from the Iowa firm executing orders 
for the purchase and sale of stocks and commodities. 
The stocks involved in the suit had been purchased by 
the New York firm pursuant to orders of the Iowa firm. 
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The account of the K ew York broker with the Iowa 
broker would be debited and credited as purchases and 
~ales were n1ade on the New York Stoek Exchange. It 
was the custom for stock certificates evidencing such 
purchases to be carried in the nan1e of the New York 
firn1 i.e., as street certificates, until such time as "ordered 
out.'' The Iowa brokerage firm becmne bankrupt. There-
after, Korns and nun1erous other customers of the bank-
rupt firn1 sued the Ke'v York brokers (Thomson & :Mc-
ICinnon) claiming securities in the stock account in New 
York belonged to the plaintiffs and had been converted 
by the defendants and also claiming that the relation-
ship between the hYo brokerage firms made the New 
York firm liable for the Iowa firm's defaults. As to 
Korns' clain1, the evidence showed that Korns had di-
rected the Iowa brokers to buy 100 shares of United 
States Steel stock at $65.50 per share. The Iowa brokers 
directed the K ew York brokers to buy the stock and this 
was done on the Nww York Exchange pursuant to that 
order. Korns was advised by the Iowa brokers of the 
purchase and thereupon paid them for the stock. The 
shares were held by the New York broker in his account 
with the Iowa broker. !Corns sued the New York broker 
for conversion of the stock. The Court's opinion states: 
"When the plaintiff and his assignors caused 
their orders for the purchase of certain stocks to 
be given to Harper Strauss & Co. they understood, 
or should have understood, that the orders were for 
e..xecution in the New York Stock Exchange. They 
knew, or should have known, the relation of Har-
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per Strauss & Co. to this Exchange, and its mode 
of transacting business therein through other 
brokerage houses. They must be held to have 
contemplated and authorized a course of dealing 
in accordance with the rules and customs of the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
"'A person dealing at a particular market 
\vill be taken to have dealt according to the known 
general customs and usages of that market; and, 
if he employs others to act for him in buying and 
selling at such market, he will be held as intend-
ing that the business should be conducted accord-
ing to such general usage and custom of such mar-
ket; and this has been held to be the rule whether 
he in fact knows of the custom or not.' Samuels 
v. Oliver, 130 Ill. 73, 22 N.E. 499, 500. See, also, 
Taylor v. Bailey, 169 Ill. 181, 48 N.E. 200. To the 
same effect is the case of Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 
Conn. 198, 26 A. 87 4, 28 A. 104, 21 L.R.A. 102." 
Lynch testified that he knew Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia was a New York stock and must be purchased 
on the New York Stock Exchange. 
"Q. You knew that those stocks were listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange, didn't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That was the place where :\Ir. Badger would 
have to obtain them for you~ 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. Well, calling your attention to Plaintiff's 
E.xhibit 6, what do the words, 'NYSE' mean 
to you1 
A. New York Stock Exchange. 
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Q. That tells you that that has been purchased 
on the New York Stock Exchange, does it 
not? 
A. That i8 what it says. 
Q. And that is \vhat you knew Mr. Badger would 
do with reference to the purchase of the 
Standard Oil of California stock, did you not f 
A. I expected him to." (R. 24 & 25). 
The general rule is stated in the annotation in 79 
A.L.R. at page 59:2 as follows: 
"As a general rule, subject to certain limit-
ations, a customer who engages a broker to exe-
cute an order on a stock or produce a.xchange 
confers authority on such broker to conduct the 
transaction according to the rules and established 
customs of the exchange on which he deals, and 
the customer is thereby bound by such rules and 
customs, even though he does not have actual 
knowledge of them." 
Thus it can be seen that Lynch authorized or is deemed 
to have authorized Badger to deal with a broker having 
a seat on the N e·w York Stock Exchange when he directed 
Badger to purchase Standard Oil of California, a New 
York stock. 
Concerning the question of "ownership" of stock, 
the Court in the Korns case 1nade the following observa-
tion: 
"It is claimed by the plaintiff that there was 
a conversion of the stocks and securities. The 
stocks and securities never became the property 
of the plavrdiff. There was a conversion by Har-
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]Jer Strauss & Co. (the initial broker) of the 
moneys which had been paid to that company by 
the plaintiff and his assignors for the p1.trchase 
of the stocks. There was a want of good faith on 
the part of, and fraud practiced by, Harper 
Strauss & Co. on its customers, but does this want 
of good faith and fraud on the part of Harper 
Strauss & Co. affect the defendants (the carrying 
broker) in any respect~ Under all the authorities 
called to the attention of the court, a presumption 
attached that the defendants, having come into 
the possession of the securities lawfully, had the 
right to sell them to protect their lien rights there-
on." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court goes on to point out with meticulous care 
(page -!-t-9) that the plaintiff was the customer of the 
initial broker; that the relationship of customer and 
broker never existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
that the securities in question were never in the hands 
or under the control of plaintiff. 
"The fact that Harper Strauss & Co. had 
received payment from plaintiff and his assignors 
to cover the purchase price of these stocks in no 
manner affected the rights of the defendants. 
They had no information with respect to this pay-
ment. They were dealing entirely with Harper 
Strauss & Co., (*as was Hogle with the Badger 
Omnibus Account) and they were holding these 
securities as the property of Harper Strauss & 
Co., and as security for the indebtedness due from 
Harper Strauss & Co. to them, and under these 
circumstances it is clear that the defendants had a 
right to hold such securities until the indebted-
ness due and owing them from Harper Strauss & 
Co. was paid." (*added.) 
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Pr.....AI:XTIFF'~ CAsEs ARE NoT IN PoiNT. 
Plaintiff devotes a large portion of his brief to a dis-
cussion of questions of title in suits between a customer 
and his broker. The cases upon which plaintiff relies all 
relate to disputes between the cust01ner and the trustee 
in bankruptcy, or receiver, or administrator, of the estate 
of the customer's broker. That is to say, plaintiff's cases 
are suits between Lynch and Badger's estate. No third 
party was involved. 
Under point one of his brief, plaintiff lists some 17 
cases for the proposition that "stocks purchased by a 
broker for his client are the property of the client and 
title thereto immediately vest in the purchasing client." 
As it concerns the equitable title, the proposition of law 
cited from these cases is true as between a broker and his 
client, but in the instant case we are concerned with a 
three party relationship. Lynch had a paramount right 
to the stock as between himself and Badger but not a 
traceable title which could be asserted to any 40 shares 
in Hogle's possession. Plaintiff ignores the completely 
negotiable character of the res here involved, to wit the 
cashier's check which Lynch delivered to Badger. Quoted 
from extensively by plaintiff is Gorman v. Littlefield, 
trustee in bankruptcy of Albert 0. Brown, et al, 229 U.S. 
19, 57 L. Ed. 1047. There a bankrupt firm of stock-
brokers held 350 shares of Green Cananea Copper Com-
pany stock in its box. The certificates were endorsed in 
blank and no other creditors clai~ed this class of stock. 
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Plaintiff had ordered the stockbroker to purchase 250 
shares of this stock and had fully paid for it but never 
received it. The issue in the case was: 
"Are these shares of stock a part of the gen-
eral estate for the benefit of creditors or should 
they be turned over to the claimants 1" 
The shares of copper stock which were only claimed 
by plaintiff were held not to be a part of the bankrupt 
estate for the benefit of general creditors, but were the 
.property of the customer. Where there is not sufficient 
stock to satisfy claims against that class of stock, the 
smne must be prorated mnong all of the stockbroker's 
customers. Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874, 
28 Atl. 104. The Supreme Court of the United States 
held in Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 
512, 52 L. Ed. 835, that the customer has such an interest 
in the stock held by his broker "that a delivery to him by 
an insolvent broker is not a preference." 
Plaintiff throughout his brief continues to assume 
and argue as if he were suing the administrator or a 
trustee in bankruptcy, appointed for Badger. But in the 
present situation Lynch, a customer of Badger's, is suing 
Hogle, the carrying broker, with whom there is no privity 
of contract. Neither party knew of the other until after 
Badger's death. Plaintiff has not cited a single case sus-
taining any theory of liability on the part of defendant. 
In Barbour v. Sproul, et al, cited and relied upon by 
plaintiff, 239 Pa.171, 86 Atl. 714, the Court stated: 
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''The sub-brokers (carrying broker) dealt 
only with the (initial) broker and not with the 
customer, and then had the right to hold all the 
stock purchased for the broker until the accounts 
had been settled between them and the balance due 
had been paid to the former." 
Thus a three party relationship is often established 
in order to effectuate a customer's purchase order of 
New York stocks. The initial broker is the agent of the 
cu8tomer. As between the initial broker and the carrying 
broker, the initial broker is clothed with the authority of 
his principal to· purchase in his (the broker's) name and 
to pledge those stocks with the carrying broker in order 
to secure the 1narginal balances which may be advanced 
by the carrying broker. In Austin v. Hayden, it is stated 
at page 322 of Volu1ne 137 N.W. Reporter: 
"The relation of the parties is pledgor and 
pledgee; the broker's ultimate rights in the stock 
being limited to the money he had advanced to 
purchase the same, with interest, and his com-
missions for transacting the business, in which he 
is protected by the partial payment the customer 
has Inade and the stock which he holds in pledge . 
.Jiarkham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Skiff v. Stod-
dard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 87-!, 28 Atl. 104, 21 
L.R.A. 102. Content v. Banner, 184 N.Y. 121, 76 
N.E. 913, 6 Ann. Cas. 106; Richardson v. Shaw, 
209 U.S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L. Ed. 835, 14 
Ann. Cas. 981 and cases there cited." 
From a study of Austin v. Hayden, (1912) 171 Mich. 
'38, 137 N.W. 317, and Korns v. Thomson & JllcKinnon, 
2:2 F. Supp. 4-t-2, the Court will see: (1) that plaintiff did 
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not own a traceable title to any shares of stock; (2) that 
plaintiff entrusted Badger with cash; (3) that before any 
stock was ordered out in Lynch's name, Badger misap-
propriated the credit given to him by Lynch; ( 4) that 
Hogle executed the order to sell in the ordinary course 
of busines~, and entirely in good faith, ( 5) that the only 
converter in this ea;-;e was Badger not J. A. Hogle & Co. 
and ( 6) that Hogle is an innocent pledgee for value. 
In Austin v. !!ayden, supra, the initial broker -..vas 
Currie & Co. The i~sues were defined as follows (at page 
323 of 137 N.W.): 
"The customers and owners, by intrusting 
their stocks so indorsed to Currie & Co., either by 
delivery, or by authorizing their purchase for 
them through those channels of trade, invested 
Currie & Co., their brokers who were dealing with 
the public in that special line, with the indicia 
of ownership, thus putting into the hands of such 
brokers power to appear as the true owner and 
perpetrate the frauds complained of. \V e think 
that, under the authorities referred to, the owner 
is estopped from asserting paramount interest 
against an innocent purchaser, or an innocent 
pledgee, who has acquired the stock in the usual 
course of trade, for value, without notice and in 
good faith." 
The Trial Court correctly determined that Hogle 
did not know that Badger was in financial difficulties 
prior to his death. Hogle made immediate funds avail-
able to Badger in the ordinary course of business and 
customarily dealt with other brokers in the same manner. 
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Badger and J. A. Hogle & Co. were competitors. Cer-
tainly, as far as the Lynch transactions were concerned, 
Hogle had no rneans of ascertaining who Badger's custo-
nler was that had dealt in Standard Oil of California 
stock. Badger would not disclose his customers' names 
to J. A. Hogle & Co. In fact, if Hogle had refused to 
execute sale orders given to J. A. Hogle & Co. by Badger, 
Hogle would have been liable for such refusal. K ryl v. 
Pierce, 289 Ill. App. 10, 6 N.E. 2nd 521; Ma.rkham v. 
Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Knowlton v. Fitch, 52 N.Y. 288; 
.:Ueyer on the La.w of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges, 
Sec. 134. 
POINT II. DEFENDANT J. A. HOGLE & CO. DEALT 
WITH BADGER IN THE NORMAL ARMS-LENGTH BROKER-
TO-BROKER RELATIONSHIP AND IN THE ORDINARY 
COURSE OF BUSINESS AND ENTIRELY IN GOOD FAITH. 
Plaintiff says that the so-called exchange of checks 
was in the nature of a "kiting" transaction. Anyone 
familiar with the brokerage business would know of 
Badger's constant necessity for "Federal funds." For 
plaintiff to liken the check transactions between Hogle 
and Badger to a "kiting" arrangement is utterly ridicu-
lous. Plaintiff might as well say that if periodically 
Z. C. M. I. goes to the First National Bank of Salt Lake 
City and draws on its account in that bank by giving the 
bank a check for $25,000 and receives in a-x:change from 
the bank a cashier's check for use in paying for a draft 
covering shipments ordered by Z. C. :NL I., then the First 
National Bank and Z. C. M. I. are engaged in a "kiting" 
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transaction. r 011 never have a kiting transaction 
'trhcre the ]JCrrson. delivering the check is drawing on su,b-
stantial credits in his account with the other party. In 
every instance when J. A. Hogle & Co. gave Badger a 
Hogle check, the margin credits in Badger's Omnibus 
Account more than covered the check given by Hogle. 
In not one single instance during Badger's lifetime did a 
check given by Badger to J. A. Hogle and Co. ever come 
back unpaid. The one single instance in which Badger's 
check "bounced" occurred after Badger's death. 
As a broker J. A. Hogle and Co. knew that Badger 
must be receiving securities through the Federal Reserve 
Bank at Salt Lake City and to obta,in those securities 
had to have "Federal funds." If Badger bought stocks 
or bonds in Chicago, New York City, or elsewhere, thr 
seller would bundle up the securities, attach a sight draft, 
and ship the draft and securities to the Federal Reserve 
Bank at Salt Lake City. Upon the arrival of the securi-
ties, the Bank would notify Badger of the mnount of the 
draft. The Bank's rule was that it would not take a check 
on any bank but that it must receive "Federal funds" 
upon delivery of the securities. Now F'ederal funds would 
consist of a draft on the Federal Reserve Bank issued 
by a member bank. When ::Mr. Badger would receive the 
check of J. A. Hogle and Co., he would take that check 
to Walker Bank and Trust Company or to some other 
bank in Salt Lake City that was a member of the Federal 
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Reserve Ry~h·1n, endorse the check and receive "Federal 
funds." :Jlr. Nimnoth testified fully with regard to this 
brokerage practice ( R. 143 to 145). 
'•Q. * * * \Yith regard to the endorsmnent on the 
back of these Hogle checks that state 'For 
Federal Reserve drafts' do you know, l\1r. 
Xiemoth, whether or not it is the general 
practice in the brokerage business for securi-
ties to be sent through the Federal Reserve 
Bank and for the Federal Reserve Bank to 
1nake delivery direct to the broker, but to 
demand Federal funds~ 
A. Yes it is. It is a daily practice. 
Q. It is a daily practice~ 
A. Yes sir." (R. 143). 
It i::-; of no consequence that in smne instances the checks 
of J. A. Hogle are not marked by Badger "for Federal 
funds." :Jlr. Niemoth testified that all shipments of 
securities from the East are not sent through the Federal 
Reserve Bank, but that they might be sent direct to a 
Salt Lake City bank with instructions to deliver the se-
curities upon payment of the draft attached (R. 145). 
Badger would need Salt Lake City funds to obtain such 
securities. J. A. Hogle & Co.'s duty was to see that the 
Omnibus Account was at all times properly margined. 
It must be clear from the exhibits covering the Omnibus 
Account that Hogle fully discharged that duty and that 
any checks given by Hogle to Badger were given in good 
faith in the ordinary course of business and within the 
margin requirements. 
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A ver~· important fact about the manipulation of 
funds by Badger is that up until10 days before his death, 
Badger always cashed Hogle's check in the Salt Lake 
bank on which it was drawn and he customarily endorsed 
the checks: 
"For Fed. Res. Dft. 
Richard C. Badger & Co. 
Badger" 
During the last 10 days of his life Badger took some 
of the Hogle checks direct to Ogden and cashed them in 
the First Security Bank (R. 59). Badger told Hogle that 
he needed federal funds for picking up drafts through 
the Federal Reserve and not until after Badger's death 
did J. A. Hogle & Co. receive a bank statement with their 
checks returned showing that they had not in fact been 
used for this purpose (R. 110). Mr. Maw, plainliff's 
witness, testified that Ba.dger "deposited all of Hogle's 
checks in the Salt Lake lwnk until the last 1,reek or so of 
his life." (R. 48). 
If J. A. Hogle & Co. had had any intimation or knowl-
edge that Badger was in financial trouble, would J. A. 
Hogle & Co. three days before Badger's death have given 
Badger, Hogle's check for Thirty-Two Thousand ($32,-
000) Dollars (Exhibit 2) and charged that amount 
against the Omnibus Account f Would Hogle on :March 
24th have accepted Badger's check for Thirty-Four 
Thousand ($34,000) Dollars (Exhibit 11) drawn on Bad-
ger's account with the First Security Bank at Ogden and 
have given Badger immediate credit in his Omnibus Ac-
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count for the check if J. ~-\.. liogle & Co. had had any in-
timation or knowledge that Badger was in financial dif-
ficulties 1 Obviously to ask these questions is to answer 
thenr .. At the tirne of trial J. A. Hogle & Co. had present-
ed its clailn to the Adrninistrator of Badger's estate for 
One Hundred Seventy Thousand, One Hundred Forty-
Three and 38/100 ($170,1±3.58) Dollan:;, and at that time 
J. ~-\.. Hogle & Co. held in cash One 1-Iundred Fourtee~ 
Thousand, Three Hundred Twenty-Five and 25/100 
($11±,3:23.:23) Dollars which represented the amount re-
ceived frmn the sale of the stocks in the Ornnibus Account 
(R. 97, 98). The stocks had been sold pursuant to stipula-
tion of J .. .:\ .. Hogle & Co. and the Administrator of the 
estate and under order of the Probate Court administer-
ing the estate. This stipulation had been rnade because 
all of the interested parties and the Court felt that the 
stocks in the Omnibus Account should be liquidated in 
order to avoid wide fluctuation in the rnarket value pend-
ing the administration of the estate. The stipulation and 
the Court Order expressly provide that the proceeds 
frmn the sale shall be held by J. A. Hogle & Co. in lieu of 
the stocks and subject to the same liens and indebted-
ness (R. 97). Hogle also held in the account some Park 
City Consolidated stock and other odds and ends which 
had been pledged by Badger. These stocks were not of 
large value. The Park City stock particularly had had a 
precipitous decline immediately after Badger's death 
(E.xhibit 6-Schedule A-1, & R. 97). The probability 
that Hogle will sustain a large loss because of its deal-
ings with Badger further indicates that it had no notice 
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that Ba<lger wa~ a crook. Badger perpetrated a fraud 
upon the defendants as well as the plaintiff. 
As to what constitutes bad faith in this situation of 
one stockbrokPr dealing with another, the following quo-
tation from the J(orns case is appropriate. (Page 449 of 
22 F. Supp.): 
"It is stated in l{ittredge v. Grannis, 244 1\.Y. 
168, on page 178, 155 N.E. 88, 91: ':Mere negli-
gence in taking a negotiable instrument is not 
enough. Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc. R.R. Co., 150 
N.Y. 59, 44 N.E. 701, 34 L.R.A. 69, 55 Am. St. 
Rep. 646. There must be bad faith. Actual notice 
on the part of the transferee of the defect in title 
is sufficient proof on this point. Less may make 
a question of fact. Gross carelessness ( Canajo-
harie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N.Y. 191, 25 
N.E. 402, 10 L.R.A. 676), knowledge of facts that 
would create suspicion in the mind of a prudent 
man (Seybel v. Nat. Currency Bank, 54 N.Y. 288, 
13 Am. Rep. 583), circumstances that otherwise 
fairly raise the question of his bad faith and create 
reasonable grounds for suspecting his conduct in 
the transaction (American Ex. Nat. Bank v. N.Y. 
Belting, etc. Company, 148 N.Y. 698, 43 N.E. 168; 
Second Nat. Bank v. Weston, 172 N.Y. 250,64 N.E. 
949), permit the inference that his conduct was 
not innocent.'" 
Plaintiff contends that because Badger dealt with 
Hogle through an Omnibus Account, Hogle knew that 
Badger was acting as agent for some customer of his, 
and from this premise it is implied that Hogle should 
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not haYe carried out orders to sell. The same contention 
was discussed in the Korns case and detennined to be 
without n1erit. 
.. It 1nay be true that the defendants knew that 
Harper ~trauss & Co. was giving these orders for 
the purchase of stock on behalf of other people, 
but, as was stated in Willard v. White, 56 Hun 
3S1, 10 X.Y.S. 170, 173, 'what other people, or who 
they were,' or whether in fact Harper Strauss & 
Co. was operating on its o1vn account, 'they had 
no 1neans of knowing and no reason to surmise.' 
The defendants were dealing with Harper Strauss 
& Co., and with it alone, and they looked to Har-
per Strauss & Co. for the payment of its account, 
and held these securities, received by purchase by 
them for Harper Strauss & Co., as security there-
for." 
The principle of equitable estoppel which governs 
the disposition of this case was discussed and applied 
by this Court in Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle, 64 U tab 
572, :23:2 Pac. 5-!1. The case is cited in an extensive anno-
tation on the subject at 73 A.L.R. page 1409 and its hold-
ing is embodied in this quotation (P. 576 of 64 Utah) : 
'"\Vhen she indorsed her stock certificate in 
blank and delivered it to the defendant Argyle, 
she invested him with all the indicia of title and 
ownership, and if he abused the confidence re-
posed in him and appellant suffered a loss, she, 
and not the plaintiff, must bear such loss." 
This language fully answers plaintiff's contention at page 
21 of Lynch's brief, that neither "Badger nor anyone 
else had authority to sell, pledge or in any way handle 
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the stock purchased for Lynch except to order its trans-
fer and delivery to him." As pointed out in the Argyle 
and the Korns case~, supra, Lynch clothed Badger with 
indicia of ownership and, therefore Lynch is equitably 
ei-itopped from denying that his agent, Badger, had au-
thority to aet for him. See also Brou·n v. Wright, 48 
Utah 633, 1()1 PaC'. 4-1-S; Adams v. SiZ,rer Shield Mining 
and 1ll ill ing Co. et al, s~ rtah 58(i, 21 P. 2d 886; and 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork 'C. Spanish Fork Irr. 
Co., lOIUtah 219, 1 :l2 P. 2d 5-t-7. 
If plaintiff would acknowledge the role that Badger 
played in this case it would be unnecessary for him to cite 
and confui-ie in his brief "a number of brokerage bank-
ruptcy cases u-lzich discuss inconceivably complicated 
situations! ... " (Page 25, appellant's brief). Plaintiff 
relies on the decision in Pippey's Appeal (In reT. A. Mc-
Intyre & Co., 181 Fed. 955) ·which discusses the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel and concludes that because the re-
pledgee did not sell the initial broker's customer's stoek 
but still held it in its hands, (the stock was registered 
in the customer's name) the re-pledgee had not given 
value for the stock and therefore was not a B.F.P. for 
ralu.e. \Yhen Hogle executed the order to sell, it credited 
the Omnibus Account with the proceeds and thereby gave 
value to Badger. Hogle did not convert the stock to its 
own use. Other than the commission which it charged 
Badger, J. A. Hogle & Co. obtained no benefit from the 
transaction. Hogle certainly has not been unjustly en-
riched as claimed by plaintiff. 
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In Austin c. Hayden, 171 :Jlich. ~~~' 137 N.W. 317, 
the ~uprmne Court of :Jlichigan affinned the Trial 
Court's finding of fact that Hayden Stone & Co. (the 
X ew York broker) was not a bona fide purchaser of 
Currie & Co.'s customer's stocks after June ~3, 1908, 
on which date the defendant had an opportunity to study 
an audit of Currie & Co. (the initial broker) which it 
made in connection with taking over certain of Currie 
& Co.'s accounts. The audit revealed the fraudulent dis-
crepancies committed by Currie & Co. After said date 
the Court found that the defendant carrying broker and 
the initial broker were "playing the gmne together" and 
that defendant ceased to be an innocent party dealing in 
good faith; that thereafter it becan1e a rnatter of si1nple 
agency between the two brokerage firms, unprotected 
by equitable estoppel or the usages and customs of the 
:-..;tock :&whange. Comparison with this fascinating 1fichi-
gan decision will lead this Court to affirm the Trial 
Court's determination that Hogle had no knowledge of 
Badger's fraudulent activities. 
One or two other matters mentioned in pJaintiff's 
brief need clarification. Plaintiff states that because 
Badger died on ~larch 27th and the normal settlement 
date for the 50 share sale transaction that occurred on 
:Jlarch :2-!th would be the 28th (three full business days 
after trade date, R. 10-!) - "No settlement was ever 
made." (Page 30 appellant's brief) The settle1nent date 
is the date at which time payment for a purchase order 
must be con1pleted (R. 82). It means that Hogle must 
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have the marginal requirement satisfied on that date (R. 
104). rrhis lapSP of three days gives the bookkeeping de-
partment time to compute the balance in the customer's 
account and the statement made by plaintiff is erroneous. 
Hogle's New York Office sold 50 shares of Standard 
Oil of California on l\larch 24th, the date it was directed 
to do so hy Badger. The sale was fully consummated 
l\Iarch 24th. All that remained to be done on l\farch 
:2Sth wa~ to deliver 50 shares in street certificates to 
the purchasing K ew York broker and credit Badger's 
Omnibus Account. These things were done. Settlement 
was made. 
STOCKBROKERS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
\Ve do not intend to \\Tite a text on the stock broker-
age business and the control of credit by the Federal 
Reserve but these matters were testified to extensively 
by Mr. Nie1noth, cashier for J. A. Hogle & Co. (R. 138, 
139 & 15-t). For those members of the Court who may be 
interested, the following is set forth: 
(a) An Omnibus Account. Badger maintained 
with J. A. Hogle & Co. an Omnibus Account. This ac-
count embraced transactions of J. A. Hogle & Co. for 
Badger relating to New York stocks. These transac-
tions were regulated by the Rules of the New York Stock 
Exchange and of the Federal Reserve Board. The 
broker, Badger, was required in the Omnibus Account to 
1naintain a margin such that at no time did the indebted-
ness of the account e...xceed seventy-five per cent (75%) 
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of the value of the securities in the account (R. 175). 
For exan1ple, if on a particular day there were in the 
account securities of a value of Four Hundred Thousand 
($±00,000) Dollars, (the value being based upon the 
1narket that day), then Badger was entitled to borrow on 
the account not to exceed Three Hundred Thousand 
( $300,000) Dollars. In other words, the Omnibus Ac-
count was n1ade up of two general compilations, (E~~ 
hibits G & H) i.e. (1) a description of the securities in 
the account and (2) an itemization of the amounts bor-
rmved by Badger against those securities (R. 128). The 
securities were pledged to secure the payment of the 
anwunt that Hogle had loaned to Badger in the account. 
The securities were not in Badger's name nor in the 
name of any of his customers bw.t were in the name of 
J. A. Hogle & Co. The physical possession of the certi-
ficates was in Hogle. If the securities in the account in-
creased in value as 1neasured by the quotations of the 
New York Stock Exchange then to the extent of seventy-
five (75%) per cent of .that increase, Badger was free 
to borrow additional money and on the other hand if the 
securities decreased in value to a point where the amount 
owed by Badger in the account \vas more than seventy-
five (75%) per cent of the then 1narket value of the se-
curities Badger would be required to further secure the 
account either by the deposit of 1noney or additional 
securities. In those instances where the account was e& 
cessively margined, Badger was free to draw in 1noney 
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the exc<·~:-' so long a~ the indebtedness against the account 
did not exceed seventy-five (75o/o) per cent of the value 
of the securities in the account. 
(b) The Federal Reserve. Congress has vested 
in the Federal Reserve Board the control of credit. By 
fixing tT1e re-discount rate for banks and the margin re-
quirements of brokers in stock transactions, the Federal 
Reserve is able to expand or restrict credit as the coun-
try's necessities requin·. The enormous sums of money 
required in the day-to-day transactions of stockbrokers 
is well known. The stock market crash of 1929 showed 
Congress that some control of margin requirmnents was 
1nandatory if the country was to have a stable economy. 
Through the Securities and E.-x:change Commission and 
the Commission's control of stock exchanges, and through 
the powers vested in the Federal R-eserve Board, this 
control is obtained. Stockbrokers not only deal in stocks 
but deal in money as well. They, like banks, charge inter-
est on their cust01ners' borrowings and are under the 
direct control of the Federal Reserve as to the adequacy 
of the securities pledged with the brokers. A change in 
the margin requirements can make a change in the eco-
nomy of the entire nation because of the large amounts of 
money required to finance brokerage transactions. For 
these reasons the Federal Reserve has promulgated 
Regulation "T" (Exhibit 7) entitled-"Extension. and 
Ma,in.tenance of Credit by Brokers, Dealers and Members 
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of Sational Securities R.rclwngcs." This Regulation 
~pecifically covers On1nibus Accounts and the time for 
immediate credit entries in the account. 
(c) U ruler Regulation '· T" brokers may give tm-
media.te credit in an account even though the check has 
not in due course cleared. The Federal Reserve Board 
has recognized that transactions on the stock market 
must be consummated im1nediately otherwise the busi-
ness will break down. Enormous changes can be made in . 
an hour's time and there must be a finality to each trans-
action the n1oment it is made. To pennit this making of 
immediate credit the Federal Reserve has adopted the 
following rule: 
"(F) Time of receipt of funds, or securities. -
F·or the purposes of this regulation, a 
creditor Inay, at his option (1) treat the 
receipt in good faith of any check or draft 
drawn on a bank which in the ordinary 
cours.e of business is payable on presenta-
tion, or any order on a savings bank with 
passbook attached which is so payable, as 
receipt of payment of the amonnt of such 
check, draft or order; (2) Treat the ship-
ment of securities in good faith with sight 
draft attached as receipt of payment of the 
amount of such sight draft; and (3) In the 
case of receipt in good faith of written or 
telegraphic notice in connection w~th a spe-
cial Omnibus Account of a customer not 
located in the same city, that a specified 
security, or a check or a draft has been dis-
patched to the creditor, treat the receipt of 
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such notice as receipt of such secud ty, 
check or draft; provided, however, that if 
the creditor receives notice that such check, 
draft, order or sight draft described in 
clause (1), (2) or (3) is not paid on the 
day of presentation, or if such security, 
check or draft described in clause (3) is not 
received by the creditor within a reason-
able time, the creditor shall promptly take 
such action as he would have been required 
to take by the appropriate provisions of 
this regulation if the provisions of this sub-
section had not been utilized." (See Exhibit 
7 - Regulation "T", pages 13 and 14.) 
Mr. Niemoth \\~as examined ·with respect to Regulation 
"T" and the matter of giving credit for checks before 
they had cleared, and in thi~ connection the witness said: 
(SeeR. 17-± & 17rl) 
"Q. Now :Mr. Niemoth, state whether or not as a 
general practice in the brokerage business 
that if, for example, Hogle should receive a 
telegram from New York to the effect that 
a check has been mailed * * * * mailed by a 
New York broker with whmn Hogle does busi-
ness, mailed to the Salt Lake Office of Hogle, 
under the Regulation that I have just read 
to you, you aren't entitled to treat and do 
treat that communication, you are entitled to 
treat it as receipt of those funds, even though 
the check is not at the time in your hands? 
A. Tnat is correct. 
Q. Now state whether or not it is necesary, in 
the ordinary course of the brokerage busi-
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ne~~, that there be irnn1ediate credit given for 
all of these transactions and that they not 
be delayed because of the clearance that ordi-
narily would result in business~ 
A. It i~ necessary that they be given immediate 
credit. 
Q. Do you know whether or not J. A. Hogle & Co. 
itself, in its transactions, that it has had with 
brokers in New York, has received credit and 
does receive credit generally upon some writ-
ten or telegraphic com1nunication that this 
in:::trument is on its way~ 
A. Yes, they do. 
* * * * * 
(R. 1-!7 & 148) 
Q. Do you know whether or not there is any-
thing in that Regulation that relates to the 
giving of immediate credit for checks, even 
though they are drawn on out-of-town banks~ 
~\. Yes there is. 
Q. Is it fair to state, :Jir. :Nienwth, that the 
brokerage business embraces not only trans-
actions in securities but transactions in 
1noney, and that money is borrowed and loans 
made as a general part of the business~ 
A. Yes it is. 
Q. State whether or not interest is charged on 
those loans by the brokers~ 
A. Oh yes, interest is charged. 
THE COURT: Those loans only pertain to 
stocks and securities, do they not1 
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A. That is correct. That is correct." 
(d) The Onmilms Account of Badger tras always 
more than adequately margined pursuant to the require-
ments of the E:rchanrJe and the Federal Reserve Board. 
Hogle's primary duty was to see that the value of the 
securitie~ in the Omnibus Account more than met the 
margin requirements of the Federal Reserve Board and 
of the New York Stock Exchange when compared with 
the indebtedness owed by Badger in the account. In 
order to show progressively the status of the Omnibus 
Account and the fact that Hogle had every reason to 
believe that Badger was solvent and acting in good faith 
and in acordance with rules of the Board and the E~­
change, the defendants prepared a series of exhibits 
showing periodically the status of the account. (Exhibits 
12 to 16 inclusive). :Mr. Niemoth testified that he had 
not picked arbitrary dates in the preparation of the 
exhibits, but had selected dates which themselves show 
reports were being made to Badger in the ordinary 
course of business (R. 135). Transaction after trans-
action was covered by :Mr. Niemoth with reference to 
the exhibits (R. 135 to 143 inclusive). We will not cover 
this in detail but to summarize Mr. Niemoth's testimony, 
it is to the effect and uncontradicted that the Omnibus 
Account of Badger was at all times properly margined 
and that Badger could have drawn from the account more. 
money than he in fact did draw; that this was true even 
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though there is taken into the accounting the $34,000 
check of Badger which was returned to J. A. Hogle & Co. 
after Badger\~ death 1narked "maker deceased, insuffi-
cient funds:~ (R. 143). 
LYxcH ~~L\DE CLADI FOR THE RETGR~ oF His :\Io~EY FRoM 
THE BADGER EsTATE. 
Because of the overwhelming evidence against 
Lynch's contentions in this case, the fact that Lynch 
has filed a clain1 \Yith the ad1uinistrator of Badger's 
estate for the return of Lynch's 1noney Inay not be 
important. It was stipulated, however, (R. :26) that the 
plaintiff filed a clai1n with George C. ~law, Administra-
tor of the estate of Richard C. Badger, deceased, for 
$1,793.45 and that the claim has been allowed by the 
administrator. The attempt in this litigation of Lynch 
to saddle his loss upon J. A. Hogle & Co. is an after-
thought and was made when it becmne aprmrent to Lynch 
that the Badger estate was insolvent. Lynch is in no 
better position than scores of other custmners of Badger 
who trusted Badger and who unfortunately did not dis-
cover Badger's defalcations until it was too late. 
THE UTAH STATUTES 
Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as adopted 
in Utah, title to a certificate can only be acquired in the 
following 1nanner: 
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16-3-1 U.C.A. 1953 
"Title to a certificate and to the ~hares repre-
sented thereby can be transferred only: 
(1) By delivery of the certificate endorsed either 
in blank or to a specified person by the per-
son appearing by the certificate to be the 
owner of the shares represented thereby; or 
(2) By delivE'ry of the certificate and a separate 
document containing a written assignment of 
the certificate or a power of attorney to sell, 
assign or transfer the same or the shares 
represented thereby ... " 
Title to the stock was never transferred to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was simply the owner of the right to obtain the 
stocks once they were "ordered out." This order was 
never given to Hogle and plaintiff must bear the loss 
because of his misplaced trust in Badger. Plaintiff's 
equitable ownership was cut off by his clothing of Badger 
with the indicia of ov1nership under the principle of 
equitable estoppel. It was at all times subordinate to the 
pledge to J. A. Hogle & Co. 
Because the facts of this case do not sustain any 
theory of liability on the part of the defendant, J. A.· 
Hogle & Co., the cases cited by plaintiff in reality are 
authority for the contentions and position of the defend-
ant. Thus in several of plaintiff's cases, it is pointed out 
that the broker (Badger) is the agent of the customer 
(Lynch). Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 
512, 52 L. Ed. 835; Skiff v. Stodda,rd, 63 Conn. 198, 26 
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.Atl. 87 4; Tuckerman r. ~U earns, 262 Fed. 607. Badger 
was not the agent of J. A. Hogle & Co., Holman u. Goslin, 
93 N.Y.S. 126. 
~\!though the r niform Stock Transfer Act deals 
with stock certificates once they come into existence as 
:3hares Tegistered in their ou·ner's na.me, this same princi-
ple of equitable e::;toppel which protects bona fide pur-
chasers for value is expressed in the Utah statutes. 
16-3-7 
" ... If the delivery of a certificate was made: 
(3) Without authority from the owner; .... The 
possession of the certificate may be reclaimed and 
the transfer thereof rescinded, unless-( a) The 
certificate has been transferred to a purchaser for 
value in good faith without notice of any facts 
making the transfer wrongful. ... " 
16-3-8 
''Bona fide purchasers for value protected.-
Although the transfer of a certificate or of shares 
represented thereby has been rescinded or set 
aside, nevertheless, if the transferee has posses-
sion of the certificate or of a new certificate rep-
resenting part or the whole of the same shares of 
stock, a subsequent transfer of such certificate by 
the transferee, mediately or immediately, to a 
purchaser for value in good faith, without notice 
of any facts making the transfer wrongful, shall 
give such purchaser an indefeasible right to the 
certificate and the shares represented thereby." 
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This is the decisive issue. Did Hogle have any knowl-
edge that Badger acted fraudulently~ Did II ogle act in 
good faith when it carried out Badger's instructions~ The 
Trial Court determined that there was no collusion nor 
participation by J. A. Hogle & Co. in the fraud nor was 
there any notice of facts and circumstances calculated to 
put an ordinar;r prudent business man on inquiry. The 
facts completely sustain the Trial Court's Finding No. 
12 to the effect that plaintiff's loss did not result "from 
any act or neglect of defendants" and that defendants 
"had no knowledge that Richard C. Badger or the firm 
of Richard C. Badger & Co. \\·as in financial difficulties 
prior to the time that Badger died on ~farch 27, 1951." 
CONCLUSION 
\Vhen Lynch on ~Iarch 16 endorsed the cashier's 
check (Exhibit A) of Commercial Security Bank, payable 
to Lynch for $1,793.45, and handed the check .to Badger, 
Lynch delivered a negotiable instrun1ent and set in 
motion the means whereby Badger could defraud him. 
Lynch did this nowithstanding the fact that in previous 
transactions Badger had been unusually slow in deliver-
ing the securities Lynch had ordered and paid for. In 
the case of the General .i\fotors stock, Badger had stalled 
Lynch with one excuse or another for almost three 
months. The statement of the F·ederal Court in the 
Korns case is particularly apt here - "The stocks and 
securities never became the property of the plaintiff. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
There wa:5 a conversion oy Harper Strauss & Co. (the 
initial broker) of the 1noneys which had been paid to that 
company by the plaintiff and his assignors for the pur-
chase of the stocks." The burden zras upon Lynch, to 
prove that J . ..:\.. Hogle & Co. converted Lynch's stock. 
This Lynch failed to do. The Trial Court found the facts 
against Lynch and there is ample evidence to sustain 
those findings. The judgment entered by District Judge 
Ray Van Cott, Jr., in favor of the defendants should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1IARR, WILKINS & CANNON, 
G. A.1IARR, 
C. W. WILKINS, 
RICHARD H. NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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